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Abstract  
Working with philosophical concepts of equality as social justice, this paper shows 
that the equality-based model of social justice as equality of status has increasingly 
come to the fore in modern EU financial consumer law. This emergent and complex 
set of private and regulatory rules on credit, insurance, investment and payment 
products has responded to the consequences of inequality between financial firms 
and consumers by adopting a set of product and rights regulation to balance the 
parties rights and duties and protect consumers from the consequences of status 
based inequality. Going forward the paper recommends that the social justice 
approach must be made transparent and become an express part of EU law and 
policy, both in order to raise consumer trust in the internal market and to more clearly 
set the future law and policy agenda.  
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1 Introduction  
Working with philosophical concepts of equality as social justice, this paper shows 
that the equality based model of social justice as equality of status has increasingly 
come to the fore in ‘EU financial consumer law’: an emergent and complex set of 
private law and regulatory rules1  in credit, insurance, investment and payment 
products. Asking questions about social justice in this area is particularly important 
due to the significance of financial transactions in consumers’ daily life; the detriment 
these transactions may cause; the significant recent expansion of the rules in this 
area; and the fact that being more explicit as to the role of social justice in this area 
(in current rules and in setting a future agenda) may be important for developing 
consumer trust in the internal market.  
The first original contribution of this paper is to offer a specific framework for 
understanding social justice in financial consumer law, one based on responding to 
the consequences of status inequality between firms and consumers.2 This is shown 
to be a better social justice equality concept to deal with the issues arising between 
consumers and financial firms, better than the concept of social justice based on 
distributive equality.3 Problems of (in)equality are at the heart of a relationship 
between consumers and firms,4 yet observing this relationship from the angle of 
                                                     
1 See e.g. Olha O. Cherednychenko ‘Conceptualizing unconscionability in the context of risky financial 
transactions: how do converge public and private law approaches?’ in Mel Kenny et al. (eds), Unconscionability 
in European Private Financial Transactions (CUP 2010). 
2 Consumers are understood in the paper as natural persons concluding financial contracts for their own personal 
needs (and their families) with firms that are professionals in selling and creating financial products. This paper 
also considers investors as consumers. See e.g. on this relationship; Niamh Moloney ‘The investor model 
underlying the EU’s investor protection regime: consumers or investors?’ (2012) 13 European Business 
Organizations Law Review 169.  
3 This research primarily relies on the work of David Miller, who differentiates equality of status and equality as 
distributive justice (or distributive equality). See David Miller, ‘Equality and Justice’ [1997] Ratio 222, 224.  For a 
more detailed account on the difference see Gideon Elford ‘Equality of Status and Distributive Equality’ (2012) 46 
Journal of Value Inquiry 353.  
4 Dimitry Kingsford Smith and Olivia Dixon, ‘Can There be a Fair Share? Fairness, Regulation and Financial 
Markets’ in Janis Sarra (ed.) An Exploration of Fairness (Carswell Thompson, 2013), 253. 
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equality has been neglected in consumer and contract law scholarship.5‘Inequality’ 
here refers to the consumer’s weaker position in terms of information and bargaining 
power in the process leading to contract conclusion; and the consumer’s vulnerable 
position in terms of bearing the consequences of the resulting relations that are often 
weighted in favour of the firm. Although these inequalities exist in most consumer-
business relations, they are especially marked in financial transactions because of 
the nature of financial products. Credit, investment, insurance and payments are 
increasingly becoming essential for consumer daily lives. Yet transactional decisions 
are based largely on a set of pre-formulated contract terms without an option to test 
and to experience products. These terms contain complex risks that are often very 
difficult for consumers to understand, and consumers would rarely have the 
bargaining power to force alteration in the terms. Contracts often involve high values 
and create long term commitments (e.g. mortgages, pensions, life insurance); 
unsuitable decisions can have severe consequences (e.g. over-indebtedness) for 
consumers and their families. 6   
The second key contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that the equality of 
status based version of social justice plays a role in EU financial consumer law. The 
paper argues that financial consumer law pursues a form of social justice when it 
goes beyond an information paradigm (which is considered usually ineffective to 
                                                     
5 Iain Ramsay and Toni Williams ‘Inequality, market, Discrimination, and Credit Markets in Iain Ramsay (ed) 
Consumer Law in the Global Economy: National and International Dimensions (Ashgate, 1997), 233; Thomas 
Wilhelmsson ‘Contract and Equality’ in Peter Wahlgreen (ed.) Legal Theory. 40 Scandinavian Studies in Law 
(Stockholm, 2000), 147. 
6 See e.g. Peter Rott, ‘A plea for special treatment of financial services in unfair commercial practices law’ (2013) 
2 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 61;Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Conclusions: Consumer Over-
Indebtedness and Consumer Insolvency – from Micro to Macro’ in Hans-W. Micklitz and Irina Domurath (eds) 
Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe (Ashgate, 2015);  Patrice Muller et al, Consumer Protection 
Aspects of Financial Services (EU Parliament, 2014), 43-63 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/507463/IPOL-
IMCO_ET(2014)507463_EN.pdf>  accessed 12 November 2018; David Llewellyn, ‘The Economic Rationale for 
Financial Regulation’ (FSA, Occasional Paper 1, 1999,), <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op01.pdf>, 
accessed 15 June 2018.  
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respond to the above inequalities),7 and regulates the substance of the firm-
consumer relationship by way of product and rights regulation. Product regulation 
sets substantive standards of suitability and fairness for the financial product and the 
terms of the contract, for example providing a fair level of fees and charges; whereas 
rights regulation gives special entitlements to consumers such as a right to withdraw 
from the contract or to modify it. The paper shows that EU financial consumer law 
increasingly does precisely these things, and thus pursues a social justice agenda.  
Going forward the paper argues that labelling rules based on product and 
rights regulation is important to re-emphasise their protective nature, and to send a 
clear signal to consumers that the EU intends to create a place for living based on 
the values of welfarism. To this effect, the paper recommends that this social justice 
approach must be made transparent and become an express part of EU law and 
policy, both in order to raise consumer trust in the internal market and to more clearly 
set the future law and policy agenda.  
The paper is structured as follows. Part 2 explains more fully why it is 
important to study this area of law and the role of social justice within it. Part 3 
discusses relevant prior work on social justice in contract and consumer law and 
explains, relative to this other work, the distinctive contributions of this paper. Part 4 
develops the framework for understanding social justice in EU financial consumer 
law. Part 5 demonstrates that this form of social justice is part of EU financial 
                                                     
7 See e.g. Olha O. Cherednychenko ‘Freedom of Contract in the Post-Crisis Era: Quo Vadis?’ (2014) 10 
European Review of Contract Law 390; Iain Ramsay ‘Changing Policy Paradigms of EU Consumer Credit and 
Debt Regulation in Dorota Leczykiewicz, and Stephen Weatherill (eds) The Images of the Consumer in EU Law 
(Hart, 2016); Irina Domurath, ‘The Case for Vulnerability as the Normative Standard in European Consumer 
Credit and Mortgage Law – An Inquiry into the Paradigms of Consumer Law’ (2013) 3 Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law 124; Catherine Garcia Porras and Willem van Boom, ‘Information Disclosure in the 
EU Consumer Credit Directive: Opportunities and Limitations’, in James Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), 
Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (CUP, 2012); Vanessa Mak and Jurgen Braspenning, ‘Errare 
humanum est: Financial Literacy in European Consumer Credit Law’ (2012) 35 Journal of Consumer Policy 307; 
Lauren Willis ‘Against Financial Literacy Education’ (2008) 94 Iowa Law Review 197; Moloney, note 2. 
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5 
consumer law in the form of rules that regulate the substance of the relationship 
(rules on product intervention and rights regulation). Part 6, the conclusion, sums up 
the arguments and highlights the importance of giving more explicit recognition to the 
role of social justice in EU legal policy on financial consumer law.   
 
2         The importance of social justice in EU financial consumer law 
 
There are a number of reasons that this area of credit, insurance, investment and 
payments is an important one to explore, and in particular an important area in which 
to ask questions about social justice.  
First, credit, insurance, investment and payment are enormously important for 
consumers’ daily lives. With the increasing relevance of financialization, i.e. the 
importance of the financial sector in replacing the welfare provisions of Member 
States; consumers are becoming more reliant on financial products to make 
provision for e.g. house, pension and insurance.8 With this trend in Europe,9 financial 
products are increasingly considered essential for consumers modern day living,10 
and access to these products is compared to services of general interest, i.e. 
services like gas and electricity without which it is impossible to function in society.11 
                                                     
8 Dimitry Kingsford Smit and Olivia Dixon, ‘The consumer interest and the financial markets’ in Niamh Moloney et 
al. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2017), 699-700. See for more: Thomas Palley, 
‘Financializaton; What It Is and Why It Matters?’ The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper 252/2007 at < 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_525.pdf> accessed 3 December 2018.  
9 In 2016, 90% of EU consumers had at last one financial product. Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 446: 
Financial Products and Services’, April 2016, 4 
<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/446/surveyKy/21
08> accessed 15 June 2018. 
10 See e.g. Wold Bank, Finance for All? Politices and Pitfalls in Extending Access (World Bank, 2008) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2018; Elaine Kempson, Sharon Collard, Developing a vision for financial inclusion (Friends 
Provident Foundation, 2012) 
<https://www.fincan.co.uk/repository/uploads/sectionpdfs/95%20Developing%20a%20Vision%20for%20Financial
%20Inclusion%20-%20Kempson%20&%20Collard%20March%202012.pdf> accessed 15 June 2018. 
11 See e.g. Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulation of consumer credit in Geraint Howells et al. (eds.) Handbook of Research 
on International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
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Albeit being essential, it is well established that financial products  are also prone to 
causing significant and long-lasting detriment. One key problem is the long-term 
nature of the products (such as mortgage loans, pensions) and the high values 
involved in the transactions (e.g house insurance, life-time saving, etc.).12 Unsuitable 
transactional decisions e.g. to take too much credit or to invest in risky financial 
products can have long term negative effects on consumers’ own and their families’ 
well-being by leading e.g. to over-indebtedness and financial exclusion.13 
Second, there has been a significant recent expansion in EU rules regulating 
payment, insurance, credit and investment transactions, in particular rules that are 
more protective than before.14 Although previously there had been rules in all 
sectors,15 these mainly required the provision of information.16 The Distance 
Marketing Directive is a perfect example of the information paradigm, containing 
numerous requirements for pre-contractual provision of information e.g. as to the 
                                                     
12 See e.g. Llewellyn note 6, 18-19 : Kingsford and Dixon, note 8, 696-697 see also Udo Reifner, ‘Renting a 
Slave-European Contract Law in the Credit Society’ in Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. (eds) Private Law and the 
Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2007). 
13 See e.g. Reseau Financement Alternatif, Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion 
(EU Commission, 2008); 
<https://www.bristol.ac.uk/medialibrary/sites/geography/migrated/documents/pfrc0807.pdf> accessed 12 
November 2018; Civic Consulting, The Over-indebtedness of European Households (EU Commission, 2013) < 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/final-report-on-over-indebtedness-of-european-households-synthesis-of-
findings_december2013_en.pdf> accessed 15 June 2018.  
14 E.g. Cherednychenko, note 7.  
15 E.g.  
• Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Aril 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers, OJ L 133/66 (Consumer Credit Directive);   
• Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance 
mediation OJ L 9; Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
2007 on payment services in the internal market OJ L 319; 
•  Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments, OJ L 145;  
• Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning 
the distance marketing of consumer financial services, OJ L 271 (Distance Marketing Directive); 
• Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
cross-border payments in the Community, OJ L 266 (Cross-Border Payments Regulation).  
16 This approach was in line with a general favour for supporting freedom of contract and party autonomy in 
European Contract Law. See Stefan Grundmann et al. ‘Party Autonomy and the Role Information in the Internal 
Market – an Overview’ in Stefan Grundmann et al (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the 
Internal Market (De Gruyter, 2001). 
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identity of the firm, the main characteristics of the contract, and the content of the 
terms and conditions of the contract.17 The policy logic of the ‘information paradigm’ 
is that information empowers consumers to make more informed decisions, i.e. to 
better understand the risks and benefits of the transactions; and that this in turn will 
increase competitive discipline over the quality and fairness of products offered on 
the market.18 These ‘old rules’ contained very few more protective rules, rules that 
directly regulated the substance of the parties’ relationship; although one example 
was the consumer’s right of early withdrawal e.g. in Art 6 of the Distance Marketing 
Directive. Such protective provisions now play a much more significant role.19  
The development of a more protective EU financial consumer law is 
unsurprising given the above discussed importance of these transactions for 
consumers’ daily lives and the potential detriment they may cause; and given that 
EU financial markets include over 500 million consumers and an economy that 
produces 15 trillion euro annually.20 These markets are seen as essential 
components of the internal market.21 The ‘new rules’22  adopted under Art. 114 of the 
                                                     
17 Arts. 3-6 Distance Marketing Directive. 
18 See e.g. Chris Willett, ‘Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law 
Journal 412, 425-429; Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy (3rd edition, Hart, 2012), Chapter 2. 
19 Cf Cherednychenko, note 7. 
20 Commission, ‘Consumer Financial Services Action Plan: Better Products, More Choice’ COM (2017) 139 final, 
2017, 1. 
21  Commission, COM (2017) 139, 1- 2. 
22  
• Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments, OJ L 173 (MiFID2);  
• Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on 
payment services in the internal market (PSD2);  
• Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance 
distribution, OJ L 26 (Insurance Distribution Directive);  
• Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property, OJ L 60 (Mortgage Credit 
Directive);  
• Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products, OJ L 352 
(PRIIPs);  
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Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, to facilitate the development of the 
internal market in financial services contain more protective rules than before. Many 
of the new rules have been adopted very recently. Some responded to the harsh 
consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. For example, Art. 23 of the Mortgage 
Credit Directive mandate Member States to have measures in place to limit the 
consumers’ exposure to exchange rate risk. This was arguably intended to respond 
to detriment caused by loans indexed in foreign currency that surfaced during the 
financial crisis.23 Others instruments responded to detriment that research identified 
as causing significant harm to consumers, either by closing a regulatory gap such as 
by providing reformed and more comprehensive rules (in line with financial and 
technical innovation) in areas that have been previously addressed, such as the 
regulation of payment services.24 At the heart of the approach are product regulation 
rules and improved consumer rights, both of which bringing more substantive 
protection than before.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
•  Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the 
comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment 
accounts with basic features, OJ L 257 (Payment Accounts Directive); and 
•  Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing technical and 
business requirements for transfer and direct debits in euro, OJ L 94 (SEPA).  
In addition, regulation on financial supervision also contain important protective measures and are relevant 
for the present research:  
• Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory authority (European Banking Authority) (Regulation on EBA), OJ L 
331;  
• Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) (Regulation on EIOPA), OJ L 331;   
• Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), OJ L 331 
(Regulation on ESMA);  
• Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments, OJ L 173 (MiFIR). 
23 Recital 3 Mortgage Credit Directive; see e.g. Andrea Fejős 'Mortgage Credit in Hungary' (2017) 6 Journal of 
European Consumer and Market Law 139. 
24 See Recitals 3-6 PSD2. 
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The third reason this area is an important one to study relates to the 
development of consumer trust in the EU single market. More protective rules 
seemed necessary not only to reduce consumer detriment, but also to raise 
consumer trust in EU financial markets. The 2018 Consumer Scoreboard shows that 
consumers attribute high value to their ability to trust financial markets;25 however, 
consumer trust in banking i.e. credit, payments and investment services is among 
the lowest of all the markets covered.26 The lack of trust is also evidenced by low 
levels of cross-border transactions. In spite of the earlier interventions the consumer 
financial markets essentially remained fragmented, with data from 2016 showing that 
only 7% of consumers ever used a financial service or obtained a product from 
another Member State.27 In fact, the lack of trust has been recently identified by the 
EU Commission as one of the key aspects that its regulatory agenda needs to 
address.28 Indeed, trust is crucial in financial consumer markets. Consumer need to 
trust that they are getting the right product, that this product will operate as 
reasonably expected and that they will be treated fairly should something go wrong 
after obtaining the product.29 Trust can be created and strengthened by regulation.30 
Providing (in addition to information rules) for substantive standards of protection 
(standards that it will be argued here are grounded in social justice values) may be 
capable of strengthening consumer trust in EU financial markets. It might help to 
                                                     
25 Commission, ‘2018  Edition Consumer Market Scoreboard’, 19 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/eujus15a-1816-i02_-_the_consumer_markets_scoreboard_2018_-
_accessibility_final.pdf> accessed 12 November 2018 
26 Commission, ibid, 42. 
27 Special Eurobarometer 446, note 13, 4. This is only a 1% increase from 2011. See Commission, ‘Special 
Eurobarometer 373: Retail financial services, 2011), 5 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_373_sum_en.pdf accessed 10 November 
2018. 
28 Commission, COM (2017) 139, 1-2. 
29 See e.g. Financial Services Authority, Product Intervention (UK FSA DP11/1, 2011), 16. 
30 Ibid. 
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10 
reassure consumers that the EU not only provides choice in goods and services, but 
also provides a high level of protection for cross border and domestic transactions, 
one that protects consumers from their weaker position relative to firms.  
Indeed, given the financial crisis and the more recent political crisis of Brexit it 
seems clear that trust problems go beyond the relationship between consumers and 
firms.31 There is a serious lack of consumer trust in entire national financial systems, 
and in the ability of Europe to deliver a better life. The EU has been described as an 
‘irredeemably neo-liberal market place.’32 It is therefore very important to highlight 
any evidence that this is inaccurate, including evidence that social justice does 
indeed play a significant role in financial consumer law at least. However, as will be 
discussed further in Part 6, increasing trust probably requires more than this. Going 
forward it may also be necessary to give a much more prominent position to social 
justice as a policy driver in EU financial consumer law, to be more systematic in 
developing specific rules reflecting this approach and labelling them appropriately as 
such. There is arguably a legal policy basis for doing exactly this in Art. 3 Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), which sets out the vision of the EU as a ‘highly competitive 
social market economy.’33  
 
 
                                                     
31 A recent study showed that people’s subjective judgments about their own and their surrounding economic 
conditions influenced their voting more significantly than the overall economic conditions, e.g. official statistics 
about unemployment and inflation rate of the state that they live in. Harold Clarke at al, Brexit: why Britain voted 
to leave the European Union (CUP 2017), 65. 
32 Phil Sypris, ‘EU law before and after the referendum- challenges and opportunities’ (2018) University of Bristol 
Law Research Paper 9/ 2018, 2 <http://www.bris.ac.uk/media-
library/sites/law/documents/Syrpis%20BLRP%20No.%209%20-%20July%202018%20merged.pdf> accessed 15 
June 2018. 
33 See for a recent commentary of Art. 3 TEU Delia Ferri and Fulvio Cortese, The EU Social market Economy: 
Theoretical Perspectives and Practical Challenges (Routledge, 2018); including consumer law: Vanessa Mak, 
Social considerations in EU Consumer Law, Chapter 12 in this volume. 
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3      Regulatory contract law, EU private law and social justice: the view of 
others 
 
There is an undeniable interest in social justice in private law scholarship.34 Many 
leading authors have dealt with various aspects of the arguments presented 
here. However, there is so far no developed theoretical understanding of equality of 
status based social justice in EU financial consumer law. In order to fully appreciate 
the contribution of this paper to legal scholarship it is useful the sketch out where 
scholarship stands on social justice in consumer law, and where this paper fits in.  
Kronman provided the first major contribution to distributive justice in 
consumer and contract law scholarship. He refuted the traditional view that contract 
law can only result in commutative justice and that distributive social justice can only 
be achieved via public laws on tax, health, education, social security i.e. tools that 
are far removed from contract law. Commutative justice is concerned with remedying 
transactional injustice between the parties, i.e. the ‘wrongs’ done to the innocent 
party when the other breaks the contract by failing to perform what is required under 
it.35 By contrast social justice is concerned with measuring behavior against some 
broader idea of fairness or justice in societal relations: i.e. some notion as to what is 
fair or justice in terms of the allocation of resources and benefits of a wide variety of 
                                                     
34 See in particular: Anthony T. Kronman, ‘Contract Law and Distributive Justice’ (1980) 89 The Yale Law Journal 
472; Hugh Collins, ‘Distributive Justice Through Contracts’ (1992) 45 Current Legal Problems 49; Iain Ramsay, 
‘Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice and the Welfare State’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal studies 177; 
Thomas Wilhemsson ‘Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law,’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 712; 
Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: a Manifesto’ 
(2004) 10 European Law Journal 653; Therese Wilson, ‘Consumer credit regulation and rights-based social 
justice: addressing financial exclusion and meeting the credit needs of low-income Australians’ (2012)  35 UNSW 
Law Journal 502, Vanessa Mak, ibid. and Hans-W. Micklitz (ed), The Many Concepts of Social Justice in 
European Private Law (Edward Elgar, 2011). See also e.g. Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. (eds) Private Law and the 
Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2007); Iain Ramsay (ed.), Consumer Law in the Global 
Economy (Ashgate, 1997); Luca Nogler and Udo Reifner (eds) Life Time Contracts; Social Long-term Contracts 
in labour, tenancy and consumer credit law (Eleven International Publishing, 2014). 
35 Ernest Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell’ (2002) 52 The University of Toronto Law Journal 349. 
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rights, freedoms, opportunities, economic benefits etc.36 Kronman showed that (in 
addition to public law) contract law too can be a distributive social justice tool in that 
the design of contract law rules involves choices as to distribution of power, risks and 
resources between parties in market exchanges.37   
Collins developed Kronman’s work. He specified that traditional contract law 
with its focus on freedom of contract is not oriented towards distributive social 
justice.38 However, Collins showed that when contracts are regulated they are 
capable of having social justice effects, provided regulation is designed by reference 
to the preferred distributive outcomes on the market.39 Similarly, Ramsay put forward 
strong arguments that consumer credit should be primarily understood through a 
distributive justice lens: as promoting values of security, autonomy and equality of 
access to credit, with a view to changing the balance of power between consumers 
and firms in the marketplace.40 This paper takes a similar approach, although it 
frames the social justice issues in terms of status-based equality as a conceptually 
distinct concept from distributive social justice (as explained in section 4.2). 
 In terms of how social justice could be achieved, Collins considered the 
choices between a vision of justice that is simply concerned with procedural fairness 
and one concerned with substantive fairness.41 More specially, Wilhelmsson has 
looked at the potential of consumer law to create social justice by comparing the 
tools of consumer law; concluding that information disclosure rules reproduce 
injustices by giving greater protection to privileged consumers; whereas rules that 
                                                     
36 David Miller, Justice for Earthlings (CUP, 2013), 40; see also on the difference Wilhelmsson, note 34,716-718. 
37 Kronman, note 34. 
38 Collins, note 34, 49. 
39 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract law’ in Christine Parker et. al. (eds.) Regulating law (OUP, 2004), 18. 
40 Ramsay, note 34, 178, 181. 
41 Collins, note 34, 53-56. 
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regulate the substance of the contract such as interest rate ceilings, and rules that 
provide greater protection to disadvantaged consumers (for example those that are 
poor or unemployed), could be social justice tools.42 The paper takes these thoughts 
further in the specialized area of EU financial consumer law. 
 The prevalence of information rules in general EU consumer law, has lead 
scholars to argue that EU consumer and contract law rules is not concerned with 
social justice. For example, Wilhemsson has cited the exclusion of main subject 
matter and price terms from the test of fairness under the Unfair Terms Directive,43 
as evidence of a negative attitude towards ‘redistributive welfarism’.44 Looking at 
information rights, Micklitz has suggested that the vision of social justice in EU 
consumer law is what he labelled ‘access justice’: rules enabling consumers to 
access the market on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. This form of justice equips 
consumers with necessary set of information rights to be able to participate in the 
market, and provides them with access to essential services (e.g. utility services). 
According to Micklitz, this model of ‘access justice’ is based on a different philosophy 
than those governing national consumer markets. This form of social justice is limited 
to providing access for consumers to the internal market, and any other form of 
social justice is left to Member States. 45 Strong views have been expressed that 
social justice should have a prominent role on in the EU legal policy underpinning EU 
consumer law and EU private law more generally as an important addition to the 
internal market policy agenda. The Study Group on Social Justice in European 
Private Law pointed out that a clear vision of social justice through fairness in 
                                                     
42 Thomas Wilhemsson, ‘Consumer Law and Social Justice’ in Iain Ramsay (ed.) Consumer Law in the Global 
Economy (Ashgate, 1997). 
43 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95. 
44 Wilhemsson, note 34, 728. 
45 Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Introduction – Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law’ in The Many Concept of 
Social Justice in European Private Law, Hans-W Micklitz (ed). Edward Elgar, 2011, 36-38. 
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contracts is missing from the EU market integration agenda.46 Taking these thoughts 
further, this paper looks at the most recent legislative interventions into the 
substance of the contract in the specialized area of EU financial consumer law. It 
shows that there has been a shift towards having more rules intervening into the 
substance of the contract than before, and these are argued to be social justice 
rules. It is true that Cherednychenko has already recognized the shift away from 
reliance on an information paradigm to more substantive product regulation; 
however, she did not frame her considerations in terms of social justice.47  
In addition to legislation, in the aftermath of the financial crisis the Unfair 
Terms Directive has been given an increasingly protective interpretation by the Court 
of Justice of the EU (ECJ): an interpretation that involves a greater focus on product 
regulation than before.48 This move has been discussed from a social justice 
perspective by Mak, but the focus of her analysis was social justice primarily 
understood in the light of fundamental (constitutional) rights. By contrast, this paper, 
considers the developments in terms of an equality of status based approach to 
social justice.49  
Now, it is important to note that ‘equality’ has been discussed before in 
contract law scholarship. Wilhelmsson has already discussed the possibility of 
developing a principle of equality for contract law: one based on providing more 
favourable treatment to those disadvantaged because of their race, gender, sexual 
                                                     
46 Study Group, note 34, 660, also more recently Geraint Howells et al., Rethinking EU Consumer Law (Ashgate, 
2018); 7-8. 
47 Cherednychenko, note 7. 
48 See e.g. Hans-W. Micklitz and Norbert Reich ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The revival of the Unfair 
Contract terms Directive (UCTD)’ (2014]) 51 CMLR 771; Howells et al, note 43, Chapter 4; Thomas Wilhelmsson 
and Chris Willett, ‘Unfair Terms and Standard Form Contracts’ in Howells et al. Handbook of Research of 
International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
49 Mak, note 33. 
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orientation or social status such as poverty.50 However, this paper takes a different 
approach to equality. Similarly to Wilhelmsson the focus is on status. However, in 
contrast to Wilhelmsson, this paper focuses on the inequality of status that arises 
purely by virtue of being a consumer of financial services and irrespective of issues 
of class, gender, race etc. Also of course, and in contrast to Wilhelmsson, this paper 
is specifically focussed on  recent developments in financial consumer law, and how 
these may be understood in terms of social justice.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that there has even been prior work on 
equality in financial consumer law. Wilson has looked at equality as a theoretical 
concept, developing a well-grounded theoretical framework for the special areas of 
financial inclusion and vulnerable low-income consumers. However, Wilson does not 
deal with the specific equality of status based social justice addressed here. In 
addition, as indicated, Wilson’s focus is on financial inclusion and especially 
vulnerable consumers; while the focus here is on the inequality of status existing 
between firms and consumers in general..51 
To sum up then, we have seen that there is considerable work on social 
justice, and on the role of various regulatory tools in generating social justice. There 
are however three notable differences in the approach taken here: first, none of the 
authors framed their thinking on social justice in terms of equality of status; second, 
the above work often focusses on the position of especially vulnerable consumers 
while the focus here is on whether protections aimed at the generality of consumers 
can also be viewed as being inspired by social justice; third, much of the work is 
                                                     
50 Wilhemsson, note 5, 147. 
51 Wilson, note 34, 501-505. 
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about social justice in general EU or national consumer law, whereas this paper is 
focused on the specialized area of EU financial consumer law. 
 
4        Social justice in financial consumer law: the theoretical framework  
 
This section first explains the kinds of inequalities that exist between consumers and 
financial service providers; and then develops a framework that explains how these 
inequalities can be seen as being social (in)justice.   
 
4.1    The unequal nature of consumer –firm relationships in financial 
consumer law  
 
Contracts are central to consumer-firm relationship; they establish, regulate and end 
the relationship between consumers and firms. 52 Contracts here are understood 
broadly as to include the pre-and post-contractual relationship between the parties.  
There is significant inequality in contracts between consumers and financial 
firms. Consumers are in a weak position relative to firms, because they do not 
typically have the understanding, expertise or bargaining power to negotiate pre- or 
post-contractually for fair, suitable contracts or fair treatment post-contractually; and 
they are in weak position to bear loss arising out of the contract.53 While these 
problems arise in consumer contracts generally, they are especially accentuated in 
financial contracts: e.g. due to financial products being so called ‘credence’ goods’ 
                                                     
52 See more on the role of contracts in financial systems: Katrina Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 
Columbia Law Research Paper 13/348, 7-10 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262936> 
accessed 13 November 2018. 
53 Chris Willett, ‘Re-theorizing consume law’ (2018) 77 The Cambridge Law Journal 179, 187-188; Chris Willettt 
and Martin Morgan-Taylor, ‘Consumer protection’ in Michael Furmston and Jason Chua (eds) Commercial Law 
(Pearson, 2013), 385-389. 
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and being particularly complex, expensive, risky and long term in nature.54 Let us 
now explore these issues in detail.  
First, there is the problem of unequal bargaining power that exists in most 
business-consumer relations. At the point of contract conclusion, consumers have no 
power to negotiate the terms of their contract.55 Rather they can only decide whether 
to enter into the contract on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.56  
Then there is the lack of informed choice.57 In modern financial markets there 
is plenty of choice for consumers between various financial products,58 however, the 
ability of consumers to make informed choices is limited.59 Financial products are 
‘credence’ goods: abstract, intangible products that cannot be tested before 
purchase and the value (or detriment) of which may only become apparent later 
though use. 60  This means that consumers must make their decisions based on the 
information received from the firms. Yet consumers will often have no time to fully 
read their complex and long contracts, and firms are able to take advantage of this.61 
It is now well documented that firms are able to use to their advantage the way 
consumers read contracts: inserting the onerous terms into the parts of document 
                                                     
54 See note 6. 
55 Ramsay, note 18, 41. 
56 Ramsay, ibid, Chapter 6; on contracts of adhesion more generally see: Friedrich Kasser, ‘Contracts for 
Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) Columbia Law review 629; Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The 
Bargain Principle and its Limits’ (1982) Harvard Law review 741. 
57  See for a general overview Ramsay, note 18, Chapter 2. 
58 See e,g, Dimitry Kingsford Smith, ‘Regulating Investment Risk: Individuals and the Global Financial Crisis’, 
(2009) 32 University of New South Wales Law Journal 514, 518. 
59 See e.g.  London Economics et al,  Consumer vulnerability across key markets in the European Union (EU 
Commission, 2016), 335 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consumers-approved-report_en.pdf> accessed 
15 June 2018; Deloitte Luxembourg, Study on the distribution system of retail investment products across the 
European Union (EU Commission, 2018), 42  <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180425-retail-investment-
products-distribution-systems_en.pdf> accessed 15 June 2018. 
60 See e.g. Llewellyn, note 6, 32-40. 
61 See e.g. Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law’ (2009) 5 European Review 
of Private Law 1; Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz ‘The no-reading problem in consumer contract law’ (2014) 66 
Stanford Law Review 545: see also Michael Faure and Luth Hanneke, ‘Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract 
Terms, Cautions and Considerations’ (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer Policy 337, 349-350 with further 
references. 
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that are likely to escape the attention of consumers.62 For example, consumers will 
often not read the ancillary terms; but will focus on the headline price.63 This enables 
firms to insert various cost elements into their complex cost structures, thereby 
developing extremely expensive and dangerous products.64 Even if consumers read 
their contracts, the highly technical language and small print is likely to prevent 
understanding, at least to an extent as to be able to really estimate the full economic 
consequences of their contractual commitment.65 For instance, given the complexity 
of cost structures, it is often challenging to determine the true cost of financial 
products:66 or  how likely it is that the circumstances the terms deal with will become 
relevant e.g. whether contingent charges will become payable,67 or how certain 
terms like foreign currency exchange clauses will operate in practice.68  
In addition, behavioural work has shown that even if consumers understand 
the terms of their contract, they often act irrationally.69 Consumers often wrongly 
interpret standard terms to appear more favourable than they are.70 As a result, for 
example, consumers might fundamentally misunderstand how financial products 
work and what the associated risks are, for example, that investments are not 
                                                     
62 Evidence can be found in results of communication science, behavioral and neuroscience as well as 
linguistics, see with further references: Ognyan Seizov et al. ‘The Transparent Trap: a Multidisciplinary 
Perspective on the Design of Transparent Online Disclosure in  the EU, (2018) Journal of Consumer Policy 
(online) 
63 Willett, note 53, 18. 
64 E.g. High-cost short-term loans such as payday loans see Andrea Fejős ‘Achieving Safety and Affordability in 
the UK Payday Loans Market’ (2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 181.: see also Muller et al., note 6, 43-63 f 
for characteristics of particularly dangerous products and FSA, note. 29,30 for particularly dangerous product 
features. 
65 See e.g. London Economics, note 60, 340. 
66 Chater al. ‘Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: a Behavioural Economics Perspective’ 
(EU Commission, 2010), 50-51 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.185.4650&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 15 June 
2018. 
67 Willett, note 53, 189. 
68 Fejos, note 65, 139 with further references. 
69 For an overview of behavioral economics and its role in consumer policy see Ramsay, note 1856-63 with 
further references. 
70 Lawrence Solan et al. ‘False consensus bias in contract interpretation’ (2008) 108 Columbia Law Review 1268. 
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guaranteed,71 or the full implication of financial commitments that a credit contract 
requires..72    
Problems in making informed decisions are exacerbated by consumers’ lack 
of experience with financial products.73 This is especially acute with products 
consumers are likely to conclude only a couple in their life such as mortgage credit 
or life insurance.  
Finally, consumer decision making may be impaired by the highly persuasive, 
misleading, and even aggressive selling practices of firms who are extremely 
sophisticated and experienced in such activities. Consumers are of course much 
less experienced, knowledgeable and sophisticated than firms, and can easily be 
coaxed into buying an unnecessary or otherwise unsuitable financial product. Indeed 
such mis-selling (e.g. mortgage loans indexed in foreign currency, or high-cost short-
term loans etc) has been an especially widespread and pernicious problem in the 
financial sector over the last two decades.74  
Once consumers have entered into the contract, the unfair treatment can 
continue. Fair post-contractual treatment of customers is often of no priority for firms. 
For example, firms may fail to allow consumers a degree of relief from their 
commitments based on financial hardship or adverse changed circumstances.75 
Firms may lack effective customer care and after sales services: making it very hard 
                                                     
71  Kingsford Smith, note 59, 530. 
72 Omri Bar-Gill, ‘Behavioural economics of consumer contracts, the exchange’ (2008) 92 Minnesota Law Review 
749, 763. 
73 See e.g.  London Economics, note 60, 340; Llewellyn, note 7, 37; Rott, note 7, 64.  
74 See e.g. BEUC, The map of major mis-selling scandals <https://www.thepriceofbadadvice.eu/static-map/ > 
accessed 13 November 2018; Olha O. Cherednychenko and Jesse-M. Meindertsma, Consumer Credit: Mis-
selling of Financial Products, Fernando Zunzunegui, Mortgage Credit: Mis-selling of Financial Products; Veerle 
Colaert, Thomas Incalza, Mis-selling of Financial Products; Compensation of Investors in Belgium < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/search.html?word=mis-selling> accessed 10 December 2018. 
75 See e.g. Financial Conduct Authority, Consumer Vulnerability (Occasional Paper No 8; 2015) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-no-8-consumer-vulnerability>; Office of 
Fair Trading, Payday Lending Compliance Review (OFT, Final report 2013) 23  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402170935/http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publica
tion-categories/guidance/consumer_credit_act/oft1481> accessed 15 June 2018. 
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for consumers to discuss any problems they encounter when performing their 
contractual obligations and hard to effectively enforce their rights.76 These various 
post contractual problems cause particular consumer detriment in the financial sector 
given the long term nature of many of the contracts in this sector such as mortgages, 
life insurance and pensions.77  
The consequences of unsuitable transactional decisions are likely to be more 
detrimental than for non-financial products. In addition to the loss associated with not 
meeting consumers’ reasonable expectations, including financial loss such as the 
products costing more than they should or not generating any substantial benefit for 
consumers and non-financial loss such as disappointment and distress;.78 in more 
sever forms, financial products can lead to substantia financial loss seriously 
affecting the consumers financial health. For example, consumers may lose their life 
savings,79 or they may experience severe debt problems that potentially lead to over-
indebtedness,;80 homelessness, personal insolvency  the inability of consumers to 
access finance (financial exclusion), ultimately placing consumers and their families 
on the margins of society (social marginalization or social exclusion). These 
                                                     
76 Office of Fair Trading, ibid, 25-26. 
77 See e.g. Reifner, note 12. 
78 James Suter et all,, An Analysis of the Issue of Consumer Detriment and the Most Appropriate Methodologies 
to Estimate It: Final Report (EU Commission DG SANCO, 2007), 3 at < 
file:///C:/Users/afejos/Downloads/FinalReportpdf.pdf .> accessed 07/12/2018; Civic Consulting, Study on 
Measuring Consumer Detriment in the European Union: Final Report (EU Commission, 2017), 39-41 at <. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consumer-detriment-study-final-report_en.pdf.> accessed 07/12//2018. 
See also Peter Huang, ‘Emotional Impact  Analysis in Financial Regulation: Going  Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis’ 
Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper 21/2006 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=870453>  accessed 7 December 2018. 
79 See the example of Lehman Brothers ‘certificates‘ in Cherednychenko, note 7, 396. 
80 Oxera, ‘A framework for assessing the benefits of financial regulation’ (Financial Services Authority, 2006), 8  
https://www.oxera.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Framework-for-assessing-benefits-of-financial-
regulation.pdf> accessed 13 November 2018; See also Reseau Financement Alternatif and Civic Consulting, 
note 13. 
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problems can cause further undesirable social consequences, such as family 
breakups, domestic violence and even suicide.81  
Unfortunately, the financial crisis and its aftermath provides bitter evidence 
that these sorts of ‘dark’ scenarios can fairly easily become realities for many 
consumers, even for those that are more affluent, i.e. well-off, educated etc.82  
         We can therefore see that the position of consumers is highly subordinated to 
firms and that there is significant scope for unfair treatment causing the most serious 
detriment. To sum up: Consumers are procedurally unequal compared to financial 
firms: they are unequal in the process leading to conclusion of the contract. 
Consumers are unable to influence the content of their contracts and it is extremely 
difficult for them to make informed choices by comparing offers on the market. They 
are also prone to being misled or persuaded by the much more experienced and 
sophisticated firm. This procedural inequality then leads to substantive inequality: to 
unsuitable and/or unfair contracts, unfair post-contractual treatment and potentially 
significant financial and non-financial detriment as discussed above..83  
It is now shown that these procedural and substantive inequalities can be 
seen as social (in)justice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
81 Iain Ramsay’ Two Cheers for Europe; Austerity, Mortgage Foreclosure and Personal Insolvency Policy in the 
EU’ in Hans-W. Micklitz and Irina Domurath Consumer debt and Social exclusion in Europe (Ashgate, 2015), Iain 
Ramsay, ‘Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market: Approaches to Debt Adjustment and Consumer 
Insolvency in the EU’ (2012) 35 Journal of Consumer Policy 421; Wilson, note 41 with further references; Jason 
Houle and Michael Light, ‘The Home Foreclosure Crisis and Rising Suicide Rates, 2005 to 2010’ (2014)104 
American Journal of Public Health 1073. 
82 See eg.  the mis-selling of Lehman Brothers ‘certificates‘ Cherednychenko, note 7, 396-397. 
83 See also on the relationship of procedural and substantive fairness in Chris Willett, Fairness in Consumer 
Contracts: the Case of Unfair Terms, (Ashgate, 2007), chapter 2. 
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4.2      The equality based concept of social justice in financial consumer law 
 
The role of equality in social justice is an important theme of philosophical 
discourse. Broadly speaking, under one view, equality is subsumed under the notion 
of distributive justice (distributive equality), while under the other view, equality is an 
independent value from social justice (social equality).84 
 
4.2.1.    Distributive equality  
 
When political theorists talk about social justice they primarily think about distributive 
social justice.85 Their thinking revolves around finding ways to distribute resources 
and opportunities in a just way within the society or amongst a given group or class 
of people. Consequently, contemporary scholarship on distributive equality focuses 
on the kind of equality to be achieved (equality of ‘what’) and the pattern of 
distribution (‘how’ to achieve this equality).86  
Under this distributional approach87 equality broadly means that people should 
be treated the same and that they should be made as equal as possible in social 
goods (such as welfare, opportunities, etc.).88 Here equality is subsumed under the 
notion of justice: justice is achieved through equality.89 A famous quote from Dworkin 
                                                     
84 In addition to her discussed Dworkin and Rawls, Miller also refers to Amartya Sen and Gerald Cohen as 
scholars associated with significant contribution to developing the concept of distributive equality. Miller, note 3, 
222-224. See for the use of the specific term ‘distributive equality’ Elford, note 3; also Carina Fourie, ‘What is 
Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strong Egalitarian Ideal’ (2012) 18 Res Publica 107. Equality 
of status is a much less researched and well developed concept. Fourie at 109.  
85 David Miller, Principles of Social Justice (3d edition, Harvard University Press, 2003), 2. 
86 Fourie, note. 84, 108.   
87 Given our context of financial consumer law, it is clear that in our context contractual rights and duties are 
distributed (so there is no question as to equality of ‘what’), we need to see how these rights would be distributed 
under the concept of distributive equality.  
88 Miller, note 3, 223. 
89  Ibid. 
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explains that equality is used in the sense that ‘people should be the same, or 
treated the same way, as a matter of justice’.90 This is normally taken to mean that 
everyone receives the same rights and benefits;91 irrespective of their social, 
economic or other strengths or weaknesses. 
This distributive version of equality does not address the above described 
equality problems between consumers and financial firms. It effectively 
decontextualizes problems, ignoring the types of procedural and substantive 
imbalances/inequalities that we have seen above. It might simply enshrine the 
traditional principles of freedom and sanctity of contract. The logic would be that this 
is what equality requires: an equal right to choose whether and with whom and on 
what terms to contract; and an equal obligation to be held to the terms of the 
contract.  
Even to the extent that freedom and sanctity of contract are to be 
compromised in some way(s), the logic of this (non-contextual) distributive version of 
equality is that both parties should benefit equally from such compromises. So for 
example take the consumer’s right of early withdrawal from many financial 
contracts.92 This is intended to allow consumers to escape from the contract having 
given it some reflection, possibly having realised its unfairness or other unsuitability 
for them: things that were not apparent when first making the contract. The point is to 
recognise the consumer’s more limited ability to appreciate these problems pre-
contractually. Firms, by contrast, do not face such problems. They are very well 
informed about the products they are selling. So treating everyone ‘equally’ by 
providing firms with an ‘equal’ to withdraw from contracts would be to ignore the 
                                                     
90 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty’ [1987-88] 73 Iowa Law Review 1, 6. in ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See e,g. Art. 14 Consumer Credit Directive and  Art. 6 Distance Marketing Directive. 
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inequalities between consumers and firms. It would also lead to unjust results for 
consumers. For example, if credit is withdrawn, consumers need to repay the money 
that has already been advanced, or if insurance is withdrawn they need to bear the 
risks themselves. This approach would create a formal equality that does not 
recognise the contextual realities, and in effect it would reinforce the inherent 
inequalities rather than correct them. 
Then there is a view of distributive equality that essentially follows the above 
approach: advocating equal treatment of everyone, although allowing for a deviation 
from this in fairly exceptional circumstances. Here formal equal distribution remains 
the key principle, but some exceptions are allowed to accommodate competing 
values. For example, the basis of Rawls’ theory of justice is that ‘each person has an 
equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties;’ but this 
bears an exception, allowing for unequal distribution in favour of the least 
advantaged members of the society (the so called difference principle).93 This 
approach might seem attractive-potentially allowing for unequal distribution in favour 
of consumers to recognise their vulnerable position vis-à-vis firms: to recognise that 
there is not actually an equal relationship between firms and consumers. However, 
the risk is that the idea of an exception here is not interpreted sufficiently broadly to 
allow for this, i.e. that consumers in general are not viewed as the ‘least advantaged 
members of society’. This does in fact seem a quite likely conclusion, given that the 
vast majority of people are consumers, many being wealthy and highly educated, so 
that it seems quite counter-intuitive to label such a broad group as ‘least advantaged 
members of society’. It seems quite likely that for many this characterisation is only 
considered appropriate in the case of some sub-groups of consumers such as the 
                                                     
93 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1999 Revised Edition), 65. 
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most vulnerable e.g. low income, unemployed etc. In other words, the risk is that the 
Rawlsian distributive equality approach ignores the very vulnerable position of the 
vast majority of consumers relative to most financial firms.  
Distributive equality is therefore not an adequate concept for our purposes. It 
would either require no action to be taken in response to the firm-consumer 
inequalities in financial contracts; or at best for action only to be taken to protect the 
most vulnerable consumers and not the generality of consumers. In fact, as 
illustrated above, instead of correcting inequalities this approach might even 
reinforce inequalities between consumers and financial firms.  
We now turn to the version of social justice demanding equality of status, 
which it will be suggested does require action to protect consumers from the 
inequalities in their relationship with financial firms. 
 
4.2.2.     Equality of status or social equality  
The idea of equality of status was developed by Miller94 and is a conception of 
society where ‘people stand in equal relation to each other rather than being treated 
as better or worse, inferior or superior’.95 It depicts a society that is not ‘marked by 
status divisions’ based on which people would be placed in ‘hierarchically ranked 
categories.’96 ‘Status’ thus means the person’s standing in the society; as manifested 
by the way the person is treated by public institutions and private individuals,97 or in 
our case, private companies (financial firms). ‘Equality’ of status refers to eradicating 
                                                     
94 Miller, note 3, 224.  See also Anderson’s ‘democratic equality’: Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of 
Equality?’ (1999) 109 Ethics 287.  
95 Fourie note 84,112 
96 Miller, note 3, 224. 
97 David Miller ‘Complex Equality’ in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds) Pluralism, Justice and Equality (OUP, 
2002), 207. 
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deeply rooted status related problems e.g. oppressive practices and policies against 
persons based on their race, gender, class etc.98  
Equality of status is different from distributive equality in two key ways. First, 
while distributive equality focuses on developing a just pattern in the distribution of 
social goods, equality of status is more focused on the relationship between people, 
and how they ‘rank’ between each other.99 Second, distributive justice may be an 
abstract concept.100 By contrast equality of status is an ‘empirically sound concept’ 
reflected in ‘real-life egalitarian movements’101 for a social order in which people are 
equal:102 e.g. movements against oppressive practices and policies against persons 
based on their race, gender, class etc.103  Equality of status therefore requires the 
abolition of ‘oppression’, of social relationships by which some people ‘dominate, 
exploit, marginalize, demean and inflict violence upon each other’.104 Now of course, 
it is fairly intuitive for many of us to think of it as wrong for people to be treated 
differently on the basis of gender, race, class etc; and it might seem odd and counter 
intuitive to think of financial firm-consumer relations in the same sort of bracket 
(assuming of course that there is no race, gender, class etc discrimination being 
applied to either the firms or the consumers).  Arguably, however, it is indeed 
possible to view the inequalities between consumers and financial firms as 
significant problems of (in)equality of status for several reasons.  
                                                     
98 Anderson, note 94,  288 
99 Miller, note.3, 232; Anderson, note 94,313. 
100 In particular this is in sharp contrast with Rawl’s model of distributive equality that is based on a hypothetical 
situation, the ‘original position’. Rawls, note 94,102 et seq. 
101 Fourie, note 84,110.   
102 Anderson, note 94, 313. 
103 Ibid, 288. 
104 Ibid, 313. 
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First, there is a status relationship between financial firms and consumers, 
one that allows firms to dominate and potentially exploit consumers via complex 
products, unfair terms, and unfair selling and enforcement practices; and this may 
cause serious hardship for consumers. [‘Firm-consumer’ status inequality] 
Second, we can also think about the status of both consumers and financial 
firms in terms of a comparison with those that participate in other markets: e.g. 
businesses supplying other services or tangible goods to consumers or to other 
businesses or private individuals contracting between each other. Compared to such 
other market participants, it will often be the case that financial firms obtain huge 
advantages as market players and financial consumers suffer huge 
disadvantages/detriment (for all the reasons explained already in terms of the 
particular dominance and vulnerability in this relationship). In other words, one’s 
status as a financial firm, ones status as a consumer of such service/products puts 
one at a huge advantage or disadvantage compared to being a supplier or buyer in 
market transactions more generally [‘Market citizenship’ status inequality]. 
Third, it can be argued that being a financial consumer may put one at a huge 
disadvantage compared to other private citizens. As we have seen, financial 
consumers may suffer large, damaging financial burdens. This in turn may affect 
their ability to fully participate in society as citizens: bankruptcy, unemployment, 
homelessness, poverty etc. can cause social exclusion by placing consumers on the 
margin of society and potentially denying them the ability to access education, 
healthcare, and other essential services and products on an equal basis with other 
citizens. It may also cause financial exclusion i.e. restrict access to financial services 
that are essential for modern living. This again may place such consumers in an 
unequal position to those other citizens that experience no problems, or those that 
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do not even need to use potentially damaging products [‘Private citizenship’ status 
inequality].105 
The consumer-firm relationship therefore raises important social justice 
concerns based on inequality of status. Following the logic of other egalitarian 
movements, the law should respond to these problems. First of all, any response 
must be done in ways that reflect the distinctive characteristics of the consumer-
financial firm relationship (i.e. the various imbalances of information, power etc set 
out above). This is in line with Miller’s vision that equality of status requires ‘complex 
equality’ which means a tailored approach depending on the characteristics of a 
particular context where equality problems need to be addressed.106 Secondly, this 
response must involve some form of distribution. Although ‘distribution’ is typically 
understood in relation to distributive equality, it cannot be denied that distribution in 
at least one sense will be involved when it comes to addressing the equality of status 
problems caused by the consumer-financial firm relationship. There needs to be 
some form of distribution in favour of the consumer:107 some regulation of how firms 
design products, and how they treat consumers. The key difference between the two 
approaches is that while with distributive equality, equality determines the pattern of 
distribution, ie. everyone gets an equal share from the distributed social goods; 
under the equality of status concept, equality is the ultimate value, the aim that 
should be achieved, and the pursuit of this aim may well require unequal distribution 
                                                     
105 See further on the link between consumers law and citizenship e.g.: Gareth Davies, ‘The Consumer, the 
Citizen and the Human Being, in Dorota Leczykiewicz, Stephen Wetherill The Images of the Consumer in EU 
Law (Hart, 2016); Martin Hesselink, European Contract Law: A Matter ofConsumer Protection, Citizenship or 
Justice’ (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 323; Norbert Reich,’ Crisis or Future of European Consumer 
Law? in Annette Nordhausen, Geraint Howells (eds) Yearbook of Consumer Law (Ashgate, 2009); See further on 
the link between financial regulation and consumer citizenship:  Kingsford Smith and Dixon, note 8.  
106 Miller, note 3, 236. See for more on the notion of complex in Michael Welzer, Spheres of Justice (Blackwell, 
1983), Chapter 2; and more on how complex equality connects to equality of status Miller, note 97, 204-215. See 
more on contextual approach: Miller, note 36, Chapter 2.   
107 Miller, note 3, 234-235; Miller, note 97, 203; Anderson, note 94, 313-314. 
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in the relevant context.108 So for instance as we shall see below the equality of status 
concept is manifest in various consumer rights to withdraw, modify and terminate the 
contract. It would be contrary to equality of status if these rights (were also given to 
firms.  
So what choices do we have? One possible response is to empower 
consumers with information to enable them to make informed decisions. This 
involves mandating firms to inform consumers on the choices they are taking, make 
the risks involved in these choices more apparent for consumers. Such an approach 
is focussed on the procedural inequality between the parties (the inequality affecting 
the process leading to conclusion of the contract). The idea of such an approach is 
that more informed decisions at this procedural stage will remove or radically reduce 
the scope for substantive detriment, consumers will choose only safe products 
because competitive pressure will force out more risky products from the market.109 
The degree of effectiveness of information rules has been extensively 
explored in consumer law literature. Although information can be useful in some 
instances such as when there is a dispute and consumers want to discover their 
rights, the dominant view is that information disclosure is not enough to correct 
inequalities between firms and consumers: it does not really enable consumers to 
avoid choosing dangerous products, nor does it exert sufficient competitive pressure 
to remove such products from the market.110 This is particularly true in financial 
                                                     
108 See Miller and Elford, note 2. 
109 See Willett, note 18, 425-529. 
110 See Reich, note 107, 13-18; Omri Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory Techniques in Consumer 
Protection: A Critique of Consumer Contract Law’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 117; Geraint Howells 
‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 349. 
See also notes for Section 4.1. 
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contracts, where information is especially likely to be of limited effect.111 No matter 
how transparent standard terms the above problems would remain, e.g. consumers 
may not notice some charges or they may underestimate the risks of other charges 
becoming payable; they may not be able to properly assess whether the product is 
suitable for them; they may be behave irrationally, and they are unlikely to be 
focussing on how they may be treated post-contractually when problems arise. Even 
if they could make an informed decision that certain risks were unacceptable, they 
would not be able to negotiate lower charges, a more suitable product or guarantees 
as to post-contractual treatment. Notwithstanding more information provision, 
consumers are likely to continue to conclude contracts for unsuitable products, with 
substantively one-sided terms.112 So while the information approach does involves a 
distribution in favour of consumers (mandating forms to provide information, entitling 
consumers to receive this information), it will very often be unsuccessful in protecting 
consumers from serious detriment. It will therefore ultimately not address the status 
based inequality problem, the above discussed problems of consumer firm 
inequality, market-citizen inequality and private citizen inequality.  
The other possible response is to provide consumers with substantive 
protection: which we can classify under the headings of ‘product regulation’ and 
‘rights regulation’. Product regulation requires firms to meet certain standards of 
quality and fairness in designing the terms of the contract (including of course the 
core nature of the financial product) and in performance of the contract. It responds 
to inequality by controlling the level of prices and charges that consumers have to 
pay, the basic suitability of the product, and how consumers can be treated when 
things go wrong. Rights based regulation provides consumers with special pre-
                                                     
111 See note 7 for references. 
112 Willett, note 18, 414. 
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contractual and post-contractual rights for example a right to withdraw from the 
contract; a right to modify the agreement; and a right to terminate the contract early. 
These rights are an important complement to the above-discussed product 
regulation. Notwithstanding the product intervention rules, serious problems may still 
arise. For example, regulators may not yet have got around to removing certain 
unsuitable products or reducing some harsh charges; or even if they have, the 
product may still be unsuitable. In such circumstances, for example, a later right to 
modify the agreement may enable charges to be reduced or especially unsuitable 
product features to be removed or amended.  
By comparison with weak information rules, these more interventionist rules 
more directly address the status based inequality problems generated by the 
consumer-financial firm relationship. Product and rights regulation makes products 
cheaper, safer and the firm-consumer relationship generally more balanced and fair. 
For example, if excessive charges are banned outright, this will make products safer 
and consumers will be assured that they are not going to be charged too highly even 
if they cannot negotiate how high these charges are for themselves. An obligation on 
firms to show forbearance when consumers experience payment difficulties provides 
security for consumers: changes in their circumstances will be acknowledged by 
firms and they will be helped in finding solution for their problems to prevent further 
negative adverse consequences such as over-indebtedness and broader social and 
financial exclusion.  
 
5        Equality based social justice in EU financial consumer law 
 
The previous section having shown that product and rights regulation can be 
viewed as appropriate tools to address the status based inequalities flowing from the 
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consumer-financial firm relationship, this section demonstrates that these forms of 
regulation have increasingly come to the fore in EU financial consumer law.113 
The specialised area of EU financial consumer law involves an emergent and 
complex set of private law and regulatory rules that regulate the relationship of 
financial firms and consumers. This includes rules on payments, credit, insurance 
and investment regulation:114  
• the Consumer Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive 
(regulating credit transactions);  
• the MiFID2 and MiFIR and the PRIIPs (regulating investment products);  
• the PSD2, the Cross-border Payments Regulation, the SEPA and the 
Payment Accounts Directive (regulating payments);  
• the Insurance Distribution Directive (regulating insurance);  
• the Distance Marketing Directive and the Unfair Terms Directive 
(horizontal directives);  
• the Regulation on EBA, the Regulation on  ESMA, the Regulation on 
EIOPA (regulating the EU supervisory authorities).115  
 
5.1      Product regulation  
 
Given the broad approach to understanding contracts as to include pre- and post-
contractual terms and conduct, product regulation is also understood broadly here. It 
includes rules that control the cost elements of financial products; supervisory 
                                                     
113 We should be clear that the information rules still dominate EU financial consumer law; usually requiring key 
information about the product and main consumer rights such as the right to withdrawal to be provided in the pre-
contractual communication and to be included into the contract. See e.g. the Consumer Credit Directive. 
114 Modern financial consumer law is understood here as a set of relevant rules that are in force at the time of 
writing of the paper (concluded with 30 June 2018). 
115 See for full references notes 15 and 22. 
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product intervention powers; rules that control the firm’s conduct and rules that 
control the fairness of contracts more generally.116 
 
5.1.1   Control of charges 
 
A substantial number of EU financial consumer law instruments aim to make 
products cheaper and safer to use by regulating ancillary charges: by banning 
charges outright, by imposing a cost cap or by linking the amount of charges to the 
actual cost incurred.117  
Some instruments prohibit firms charging for the fulfilment of their legal 
information disclosure duties. To this effect, Art. 8 of the Mortgage Credit Directive 
contains a general prohibition in regard to charging for the provision of any 
information, even though the Directive is significantly information based: it mandates 
standard information to be provided in advertising, general information to be 
provided about available credit products such as the purpose for which the credit 
may be used, possible duration of the credit, etc., than once a consumer considered 
taking a loan, creditors must tailor standard information to the needs of the particular 
consumer and finally while the duration of the contract creditor must provide 
information on changes in borrowing rate.118 Other instruments ban charging 
information that is not provided under a legal obligation per se, but that is provided at 
the consumers’ request. For example, under Art. 4(1) of the Cross-border Payments 
Regulation the provision of information necessary for facilitation of payments must 
                                                     
116 See for more product intervention options: FSA, note 29, Chapter 6;   
117 See for a detailed discussion on the ways to restrict price and charges and debates around costs and benefits 
of such intervention: Iain Ramsay, ‘To Heap Distress upon Distress: Comparative Reflections on Interest Rate 
Ceilings (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 707. 
118 See Arts. 11, 13, 14 and 27 of the Mortgage Credit Directive. For a similar approach, see Art. 40 of PSD2. 
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be free of charge. Similarly, Art. 12 Payment Accounts Directive obliges Member 
States to ensure that when consumers are switching accounts, they can access free 
of charge their personal information regarding existing standing orders and direct 
debits.  
Some ancillary charges are limited such as to reflect the actual costs incurred. 
Art. 8 SEPA limits the amount chargeable for interchange fees, fees paid between 
the two payment service institutions for direct debit transactions; Art. 12(4) of the 
Payment Accounts Directive controls the fees for switching bank accounts, and Art. 
25(3) of the Mortgage Credit Directive controls the charges payable for early 
repayment of the outstanding debt.  An especially important measure is Art. 28 of the 
Mortgage Credit Directive which obliges Member States to cap charges payable 
upon default in line with the actual costs incurred.  
 Although some of these charges discussed above are minor and are unlikely 
as individual charges to cause significant detriment for consumers, they can easily 
accumulate into more substantial costs.119 Therefore regulating these cost elements 
of products is important in terms of improving the position of consumers vis-à-vis 
firms, and preventing any disproportionate burden. 
In addition, there is an example of a direct cost cap. Art. 16(2) of the 
Consumer Credit Directive provides a cap on a charge payable for an early 
repayment of consumer credit with fixed borrowing rate. The cap is determined at 
1% of the amount of the credit repaid early (if the period between the date of 
repayment and the agreed termination of the contract is more than one year), or 
0.5% (if this period is less than one year).120 In any event, the amount charged 
                                                     
119 See the examples of UK unarranged overdraft charges in Willett, note 18 and high-cost short-term loans in 
Fejős, note 65. 
120 See for possible exemptions from and restrictions on the rule Art. 16(4) of the Consumer Credit Directive. 
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should not exceed the interest that would be payable for the given period (between 
the early repayment date and date when the contract is terminated). Assuming that 
the fixed cost cap would result in a higher amount than the interest, this is an 
additional safety net provided by Art. 16(5). Although it can be debated whether the 
cap is set at a fair level, this is an important measure that signals a clear intention to 
protect consumers vis-à-vis firms.121 
The above rules involve caps that are determined at EU level. However, EU-
law also empowers Member States to regulate products should it be necessary to 
protect consumers. The Insurance Distribution Directive gives an option for Member 
States to limit or prohibit the fees, commissions or other monetary or non-monetary 
benefits paid to insurance distributors.122 Although not providing any specific limit, 
these sort of provisions send important signals that product regulation measures 
such as this are in line with EU consumer policy and that they should be used when 
circumstances require addressing inequalities between firms and consumers for 
protecting consumers. 
 
5.1.2   Supervisory product intervention powers 
 
Next, we find examples of supervision-based product intervention in the EU.  
 The regulations establishing the EU financial supervisors confer consumer 
protection powers on the EU financial supervisors (i.e. the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA) 
to temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten the orderly 
functioning and integrity of financial markets.123 These supervisory powers are really 
                                                     
121 See Recital 39 of the Consumer Credit Directive. 
122 Art. 22(3) and Art. 29(3) of the Insurance Distribution Directive. 
123 Art. 9(5) of the Regulation on EBA, the Regulation on ESMA, the Regulation on EIOPA. These powers are 
later concretized in relevant legislation, including the specific conditions under which they may be exercised, see 
e.g. Art. 40(2) of MiFID, Art. 17 of RIPPS; Art. 40 and 41 of MiFIR. 
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important in terms of reducing consumer detriment that may otherwise flow from the 
status based inequality between firms and consumers: allowing proactive action to 
ensure that the most dangerous products capable of casing significant consumer 
detriment are not present on the market. Most recently, relying on Art. 40 of MiFIR, 
ESMA for the first time temporarily banned the marketing and distribution of binary 
options to consumers and restricted the marketing, sale and distribution of contracts 
for difference.124 These high risk investment products allowed 'betting' on financial 
indices such as the price of gold, or currency will rise or fall over a fixed period of 
time, with highly uncertain outcomes, causing significant loss for consumers.125 
In addition, there are examples where the EU law-maker specially empowers 
Member States to intervene. While the above product intervention power is provided 
for EU supervisory authorities on temporary basis, Art. 42 MiFIR provides competent 
national supervisory authorities to permanently prohibit or restrict the marketing, sale 
and distribution of financial products.126 Another example is Art. 24(7) of the 
Insurance Distribution Directive under which Member States may intervene on a 
case-by-case basis to prohibit the sale of packaged insurance products with ancillary 
services such as investment when they can demonstrate that the products are 
detrimental to consumers. 
 
 
 
                                                     
124 ESMA, ESMA adopts final product intervention measures on CFDs and binary options, 1 June 2018  
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-adopts-final-product-intervention-measures-cfds-
and-binary-options> accessed 13 November 2018. 
125 BEUC, Call for evidence on product intervention: Measures proposed by ESMA: BEUC response, February 
2018 < https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-009_esma_product_intervention.pdf> accessed 13 
November 2018. 
126 See for a recent commentary of these product intervention powers: Danny Bush ‘Product Governance and 
Product intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR, 13-et seq. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3206731 
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5.1.3    Control of business conduct  
 
In addition to the controls over the level of charges and the general suitability of 
products, there are controls over the manner in which consumers can be treated 
throughout the relationship.  
Firstly, Art. 28 of the Mortgage Credit Directive provides a specific obligation 
to Member States to introduce legal arrangements that encourage creditors to 
exercise reasonable forbearance before foreclosure proceedings are initiated. 
Creditors should act pro-actively in addressing emerging credit risks at an early 
stage, and make reasonable attempts to resolve the situation through other means 
before foreclosure proceedings are initiated.127  Other means here arguably mean 
debt mitigation measures such as debt restructuring or debt rescheduling that is able 
to adjust the loan to new circumstances in a sustainable manner. Indeed, solutions 
should take into account the practical circumstances and reasonable need for living 
expenses of the consumer.128 In addition, Art. 28 continues that where after 
foreclosure proceedings outstanding debt remains, Member States shall ensure that 
measures to facilitate repayment to protect consumers are put in place. This obliges 
Member States to secure the protection of minimum living conditions and put in 
place measures to facilitate repayment while avoiding long-term over-indebtedness. 
This approach recognizes consumers’ weak position in being unable to negotiate 
with the firm to persuade it to exercise forbearance. It also makes products safer and 
given the high values involved and the long term nature of mortgage contracts, it has 
the potential to prevent future adverse consequences such as over-indebtedness, 
and social and financial exclusion.. 
                                                     
127 Recital 27 Mortgage Credit Directive. 
128 Ibid 
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In addition to these specific conduct requirements; EU financial consumer law 
also contains examples of a broader principle-based approach by imposing fairly 
broad standards of behavior but requiring specific results to be achieved. This 
includes the well-known ‘responsible lending’ rules in Art. 8 of the Consumer Credit 
Directive and Art. 18 of the Mortgage Credit Directive that mandate firms to lend only 
to those consumers that can afford repayments, introducing an obligation to assess 
the consumers’ creditworthiness, and in case of the Mortgage Credit Directive, even 
a duty to refuse credit if the creditworthiness assessment shows consumers cannot 
afford the loan.129 Although these rules have been subject to criticism,130 they do 
improve to at least some extent the likelihood that consumers will not undertake 
credit that they cannot afford and that will lead to over-indebtedness, social and 
financial exclusion. This could be particularly significant in improving the position of 
consumers in those Member States that did not previously have these kinds of 
rules.131 
Most recently, in Art. 24(2) MiFiD2 imposed an obligation on investment firms 
to ensure that financial products meet the needs of targeted groups of consumers. 
This might mean for example that products are developed by taking into account the 
characteristics of a particular group of consumers for example their age and income 
level. If products are e.g. designed to be marketed to pensioners, it must be 
considered that they are likely to prefer less risky products for a moderate price. The 
                                                     
129 Cherednychenko, note 6, 412. 
130 See e.g.Yesim Atamer,  ‘Duty of Responsible Lending: Should the European Union Take Action?’, in Stefan 
Grundmann and Yesim Atamer (eds.), Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract Law 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2011); Federico Ferretti, ‘The Never-Ending European Credit Data Mess’ (BEUC, 2017) < 
https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2017-111_the-never-ending-european-credit-data-mess.pdf> accessed 
13 November 2018; Irina Domurath, ‘A Map of Responsible Lending and responsible Borrowing in the EU and 
Suggestions for a Stronger Legal Framework to Prevent Over-Indebtedness of European Consumers’ in Hans-W. 
Micklitz and Irina Domurath (eds) Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe (Ashgate, 2015). 
131 Peter Rott, ‘Consumer Credit’ in Hans-W. Micklitz et al. (eds) Understanding European Consumer Law (2nd 
edition, Intersentia, 2014), 219. 
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provision also obliges investment firms to sell or recommend these products to 
individual clients only when it is in their interest. It might not for example be in the 
best interests of a retired consumer to buy the investment if it is too risky or too 
expensive taking into accounts the individual circumstances of the consumer. Even if 
the product may be suitable for the majority of pensioners, it might not be for the 
consumer in question. Although the value and effectiveness of the principled based 
approach is debated;132 these kind of provisions are for allowing firms to balance 
their own interest for achieving profits with consumer interest for safe and affordable 
products in a way that suite them the best.133  
 
5.1.4 Broad fairness controls  
 
While the all the above measures could be said to aim at achieving contractual 
fairness, the fairness of the terms of the contract is also explicitly controlled by the 
Unfair Terms Directive. In the aftermath of the financial crisis the Unfair Terms 
Directive has been used to protect consumers against unsuitable (primarily 
mortgage) products;134 with the ECJ explicitly citing the goal of the Directive to 
combat the power imbalance between businesses and consumers. 135 This is 
manifest in various ways.  
                                                     
132 See e.g. Julia Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principle Based Regulation’ (2010) LSE Legal Studies 
Working Paper 17/2010 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32892/> accessed 10 November 2018; Steven Schwarcz, ‘The 
‘Principles’ Paradox’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 175. 
133 Andromachi Georgosouli, ‘The FSA’s ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ (TFC) Initiative: What is So Good About it 
and Why it May Not Work’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 405, 417-418. See more generally: Robert 
Baldwin, ‘Why rules don’t work’ (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 321. 
134 See note 48 for references. 
135Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, EU:C:2000:346, para. 25;  C-
484/08 Caja de Ahorros EU:C:2010:309, para. 27; C-168/05 Claro v Centro Movil Milenium, EU:C:2006:675, 
para. 25; C-415/11 Aziz v Catalunyacaixa, EU:C:2013:164, para 44; C-26/13 Kásler and Késlené v OTP 
Jelzálogbank, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282, para 72. 
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 First of all, the ECJ has given a generally protective interpretation of the 
Directives general test of fairness. Under Art. 3(1) a contract term is unfair if contrary 
to good faith it causes significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer vis-à-
vis firms. In the landmark Aziz case the ECJ introduced the ‘agreement test’136 
according to which an imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’ if 
the consumer would not have agreed to the term in individual negotiations.137 This 
approach takes account of the reality of pre-formulated standard contracts and the 
consumer’s inability to negotiate with firms. In particular, in referring to what the 
consumer would have agreed to, it becomes clear that the question is what 
substantive term the consumer would have agreed to, that a term must be 
substantively fair. It is not therefore sufficient for a term simply to be expressed 
transparently if it is not substantively fair.138 In further explaining how to apply the 
test of fairness the ECJ in Aziz also made it clear that a term will result in significant 
imbalance between the parties if it deviates from the applicable default provisions.139 
This is also important because it will often be the case that these default rules have 
been designed based to balance the interests of the parties, taking also into account 
the need to protect consumers.140  
 A second way in which the Unfair Terms Directive has been used to protect 
consumers is the approach taken to Art. 4 (2). This provision allows Member States 
to exempt from the fairness test assessment of the ‘adequacy of the price’ and the 
‘main subject matter’ of the contract, provided these are in plain and intelligible 
                                                     
136 Howells et al, note 46, 148. 
137 C-415/11 Aziz, note 135, para 69 
138 Howells et al, note 46, 152. 
139 C-415/11 Aziz, note 136. para 75 
140 Of course exceptions from this rule are possible. See C-280/13 Barcalys Bank v Sanchez Garcia and Chacon 
Barrera, EU:C:2014:279 where it transpired that several default provisions of the applicable Spanish law were 
significantly favouring the interest of the bank. 
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language. This provision came under scrutiny in Kásler where the court interpreted 
the provision in a restrictive manner (making it more likely that the test of fairness will 
be able to be applied). The court established that a contract term transferring the 
exchange rate risk onto consumers (where the banks more expensive selling rate of 
exchange is applied to calculate loan instalments) can only be exempted from the 
test of fairness as the ‘main subject matter’ if it represents  the ‘essential obligation’ 
that ‘characterizes the contract’.141 It also established that such a term can only be 
exempted from the test as a ’price’ term if there is a service provided in exchange.142 
Finally, in Kásler the ECJ defined the plain and intelligible language condition 
broadly.143 It was said that a term is only in plain and intelligible language where it 
was expressed such as to enable consumers to estimate the economic 
consequences of the term in question for their own financial situation.144 This sets 
quite a demanding standard of transparency. It will often not be particularly realistic 
for terms (no matter how clear they are) to really enable consumers to work out how 
they might affect them (other than in a very broad sense). This seems likely 
especially to be the case with terms dealing with complex financial issues such as 
the foreign currency exchange clause in the case at hand.145 The result therefore 
may be that many such clauses (even if they are found to be the price or main 
subject matter terms) will be able to be tested under the test of fairness.     
Finally, there is the approach of the ECJ to Art. 6 (1), the provision stating that 
unfair terms are not binding on consumers. The court has provided a very consumer 
protective interpretation of Art. 6(1); arguably seeing this provision as taking a lead in 
                                                     
141 C-26/13  Kásler, note 135, para. 49. 
142 Ibid para. 58. 
143 Ibid, para. 72. 
144 Ibid, para 74. 
145 Ibid, para 58. 
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improving the contractual position of consumers vis-a-vis firms.146 It has held that 
courts must be entitled to rule on their own motion on the fairness of terms;147 that 
there should be no limitation period for invoking unfairness;148 and that the 
applicability of the test of fairness is not limited to the stage of the process149 or the 
type of process,150 and it certainly includes a mortgage enforcement processes.151 
These approaches are especially important in allowing the fairness test to be used a 
shield to protect consumers from the detriment that might come with proceedings 
that might otherwise end with ever increasing debts and possibly repossession of 
property and consequent homelessness.152  
Enabling the courts control over the substance of the terms, including those of 
price, are important product intervention powers of the court that contribute to the 
overall package of measures that can be seen as responding to status based 
inequality. 
 
5.2      Rights regulation  
 
The other equality based social justice provisions that set substantive protection 
standards are rules that can be referred to as ‘rights regulation’: e.g. a consumer 
right to withdraw from the contract; a later right to modify the agreement; and a right 
                                                     
146 C-168/05 Claro, note 135, para. 36; C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones v Rodriguez Nogueira, 
EU:C:2009:65, para. 47; C-453/10 Pereničová and Perenič v SOS finance, EU:C:2012:144, para. 28; C-618/10 
Banco Español de Crédito v Camino, EU:C:2012:349, para. 40; C-415/11; C-109/17 Bankia v Merino and others 
EU:C:2018:735, para 38. 
147 JC-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano, note 136; C-243/08 Pannon GSM v Győrfi, EU:C:2009:350, para. 28. 
148 C-473/00 Cofidis v Fredout, EU:C:2002:705, para. 38. 
149 Camino, note 146. see also C-397/11 Jőrös v Aegon Hitel EU:C:2013:304. 
150 E.g. Claro (review of the validity of the arbitration clause), note 146; Camino (order for payment procedure), 
note 146.  
151 Most notably, C-415/11 Aziz, note. 135. 
152 In Aziz the court especially underlined that the mortgage property was a family home and that it would cause 
great loss to the consumer and its family to lose a home. C-415/11 Aziz, note 135, para. 61. 
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to terminate the contract early.153 As indicated in section 4, such rules are important 
additional protections against the various inequalities: product intervention rules may 
not have been used, even if they have been used products may remain unsuitable or 
too costly for some consumers or they may no longer be needed.  
 
5.2.1   Early withdrawal rights 
Several instruments provide a right of early withdrawal for consumers shortly after 
the contract is made. For example, Art. 14 of the Consumer Credit Directive and Art. 
6 the Distance Marketing Directive oblige Member States to provide a 14 day period 
of right of withdrawal for consumers that they can exercise without giving any 
reasons and without incurring any financial costs. The right of withdrawal is 
commonly used in more general consumer policy, the rationale of this right being to 
provide a ‘cooling off’ period for consumers, to provide additional time to consider the 
affordability and the suitability of the particular (financial) product.154  
The right of withdrawal builds on information disclosure rules.155 Even if 
consumers may pay little attention to the disclosed risks prior to entering the 
contract, they may be more prone to reflect on these risks after the initial ‘excitement’ 
of the purchase wears off, and when they are also free of the possible high pressure 
tactics preceding the sale. If they conclude that the transaction is too costly, risky or 
unsuitable, the right to withdraw allows them to escape from it. It is true that the 
nature of financial products, especially the likelihood that the real value of the 
products will not transpire in 14 days might negatively affect the practical use of this 
                                                     
153 These rights are exceptions from binding nature of contracts (pacta sunnt servanda) under which consumers 
would be bound from the moment of agreement, and which would only allow for modification or termination based 
on the express terms of the contract (or perhaps in the case of termination, based on breach by the business).   
154 See on the evolution of the right of withdrawal: Howells et al., note 46, 115-119. 
155 Ibid, 123. 
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right.156 Nevertheless, consumers may reflect more seriously in some circumstances 
eg. where they have particular concerns over their needs and whether the product 
covers them, or where they had felt uncomfortable about the pressure they felt under 
when agreeing to the purchase or the haste with which they agreed.157 So at least in 
such cases, the withdrawal right provides some scope to avoid unsuitable and 
potentially damaging products.158 In this sense the withdrawal rights can be said to 
contribute to addressing the status based inequality in the consumer-firm 
relationship.  
 
5.2.2   Right to modify contractual relationships 
 
EU financial consumer law contains provisions that enable consumers to modify their 
existing contractual relationship with firms. These are particularly important 
entitlements in long term relationships, enabling consumers to adjust their contracts 
to changed circumstance, adjustments that they would unlikely to be able to 
negotiate due to their weak bargaining position relative to the firm. 
In particular, Art. 23(1) of the Mortgage Credit Directive obliges Member 
States to have in place an appropriate regulatory framework allowing for 
modifications in the case of loans in foreign currencies. Such loans are indexed to a 
benchmark that tracks the movement of the currencies in question on money 
markets, and they have the potential to adversely affect consumers by making the 
installments much more expensive than initially anticipated. The Mortgage Credit 
                                                     
156 See also on possible behavioural barriers: Joasia Luzak, ‘To withdraw or not to withdraw? Evaluation of the 
mandatory right of withdrawal in consumer distance selling contracts taking into account its behavioural effects 
on consumers’(2013) 37 Journal of Consumer Policy 91. 
157 Cf Marco Loos, ‘Rights of Withdrawal’ (2009) CSECL Working Paper 2009/4, 6-7.  
< https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1350224&download=yes> accessed 13 November 2018. 
158 See for an overview of possible limits to this right in credit relationships: Rott, note 131, 224-225.. 
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Directive now obliges Member States to gives an option to consumers to convert to 
an alternative currency, a currency that will make installments more affordable and 
less volatile to changes. These options could be either the currency in which 
consumers receive their income or hold assets, or the currency of the Member State 
in which the consumer was either resident at the time when the contract was 
concluded or is currently resident.159 This right therefore enables consumers to 
mitigate the adverse consequences of unfavorable changes on money markets: a 
right that they would hardly be in a position to negotiate given the significant profits 
that foreign currency loans generated for banks. This is an important provision given 
that loans indexed in foreign currencies were especially common in the pre-crisis 
era, many of them having been mis-sold, causing significant detriment to consumers 
and their families.160  
Further examples of modification rights are contained Art. 16 of the Consumer 
Credit Directive and Art. 25 Mortgage Credit Directive. These provide consumers 
with the right to repay part of their outstanding debt before the agreed end of the 
credit agreement. As opposed to the above negative change in circumstances, 
consumers may also experience positive changes, such as having more money than 
planned (e.g. through a salary increase, or an inheritance). In that case, the above 
provisions provide consumers with an option to pay off a part of their loan, thus 
reducing the interest and other associated costs and bringing down the total cost of 
the credit.161  
 
5.2.3     Right to end contractual relationships early 
                                                     
159 Art. 23(2) Mortgage Credit Directive. 
160 Recital 4 Mortgage Credit Directive; see also Zunzunegui, note 74, Fejős note 23,139 with further references. 
161 See on possible restrictions of this right: Rott, note 131,225-226. 
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Finally, Art 16 of the Consumer Credit Directive and Art. 25 of the Mortgage Credit 
Directive provides consumers with the right to fully repay their general credit or 
mortgage debts early reducing the total cost of their credit. If the consumer has come 
into enough money, they may wish not merely to modify the agreement as above by 
substantially reducing the debt, but to end it altogether: thus escaping all further 
interest and other associated costs. Given the firms interest to have regular income 
from credits provided for consumers and the consumers’ weak bargaining power, it is 
unlikely that consumers would be able to negotiate early termination of their 
relationships with firms. So once again there is a contribution to response to status 
based inequality. 
 
6        Conclusion and recommendations  
  
By applying the equality of status based theoretical framework for understanding 
social justice in financial consumer law, this paper has provided an original 
interpretation of the values underpinning modern financial consumer law. Under the 
framework developed here financial consumer law pursues a form of equality based 
social justice when it goes beyond an information paradigm and regulates the 
substance of the parties’ relationship by product and rights regulation. The paper has 
showed that this equality based model of social justice has increasingly come to the 
fore in the modern EU financial consumer law. The next step for the EU must be to 
make this approach transparent, an express part of EU law and policy, both in order 
to raise consumer trust and also to more clearly set the future law and policy 
agenda.  
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It was suggested in section 2 that the more protective product and right based 
rules are not only capable of reducing consumer detriment but are also essential for 
raising consumer trust in the internal market and European integration more 
generally. Whilst various examples of product and right based rules have been 
highlighted, these remain hidden among the many non-social justice oriented 
information disclosure rules and can only been discovered with comprehensive and 
targeted research. However, in order to generate trust, the social justice approach 
must be made transparent. This means that the more protective rules must be 
labelled expressly as social justice measures and they must be connected with a 
broader social justice policy goal. Making the social justice approach transparent 
signals that social justice measures are not simply introduced on random occasions 
under the influence of various interest groups, but rather they are part of a 
coordinated policy of social justice aimed at improving the lives of consumers. 
First, then it is important to apply the label of social justice to protective 
product and right based legal tools. Labelling re-emphasises their protective nature, 
enabling consumers to appreciate the efforts of the EU lawmaker to deliver a high 
level of consumer protection. Labelling also gives a deeper meaning to the rules, 
connecting them to underling values in the society, values that signal that EU intends 
to take care of their citizens, and to create a place for living based on the values of 
welfarism.  
Second, it is then of paramount importance to connect these protective, social 
justice rules with broader policy making: to declare social justice as a clear part of 
EU consumer policy at least in the financial sector. This policy agenda is currently 
dominated with the dual aim of providing consumer protection and enhancing 
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competition on the internal market.162 Regulation for ‘better products’ in the most 
recent Consumer Financial Services Action Plan to intervene into ‘market 
dynamics’163 could be read as the EU Commission’s language of justifying the use of 
social justice measures within its consumer protection agenda. This is however only 
a possible interpretation, and one that remains deeply hidden. In order to gain or 
increase the trust of consumers, the EU legislators should declare loudly and proudly 
that their legislative agenda is in line with social justice. This could be achieved by 
connecting this policy with the vision of an EU ‘social market’. This fairly new 
understanding of the internal market was built into Article 3 TEU by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, making one of the objectives of EU integration the creation of a ‘highly 
competitive social market economy’ that includes ‘a high level of protection’. The 
combination of the notions of ‘social’ with ‘market’ provoked strong views about the 
relationship of these two notions, and a significant debate on this must be left for 
another time.164 Suffice to say that the European model of social market economy is 
distinct from national social market models.  It is certainly different from the model of 
German post-war Soziale Marktwirtschaft not the least because the EU lacks 
competences to provide for EU-wide traditional social justice measures such as 
subsidized housing, free healthcare and education.165 However, the EU does have 
competence to instate the model of social justice developed here; one where rules 
intervening into the substance of the parties’ contract get a prominent place in 
addressing the status based inequality in the consumer-firm relationship. The 
                                                     
162 See e.g Domurath, note 7, 125. 
163 EU Commission, COM (2017) 139, 15, 2. 
164 Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, ’Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model? (EUI Working Paper 
8/2004) at <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/2823> accessed 15 June 2018: Floris de Witte, The Architecture of 
a ‘Social Market Economy’ (LSE Working Paper 13/2015) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613907> accessed 15 June 2018; Sacha Garben ‘The 
constitutional  (im)balance between ‘the market’ and ‘the social’ in the European Union’ (2017)  13 European 
Constitutional Law Review 23. 
165 Joerges and Rödl, ibid.  
An updated version of this paper is forthcoming in Tilburg Law Review in February 2019 
 
 
49 
number of recent product and right based rules in EU financial consumer law are 
important developments towards a social market economy of the EU, and it is 
important to recognize this at the broader policy level. As in other areas of EU law, 
EU financial consumer law remains ‘distinctively light on ‘social’ and heavy on 
‘market’’ elements,166 but the social elements are undeniably present.   
Making the social justice oriented approach transparent is also important to 
more clearly set the future law and policy agenda. Labelling the protective rules as 
social justice measures and making them part of the policy agenda would force the 
EU-lawmakers, primarily the EU Commission, to rethink and make their legislative 
approach to including social justice measures (more) systematic. This means 
rethinking what is meant by a ‘high level of consumer protection’ and what regulatory 
tools are capable of achieving this. This would also mean having a better idea as to 
what kind of product and rights regulations work best at EU level, and which ones 
should be left to Member States. It would also mean making a conscious decision to 
use social justice measures across the board in financial consumer contract 
regulation, instead of the current unsystematic, patchy approach to rule making. For 
example, while mandatory information disclosure is frequently present, only a couple 
of instruments provide for the free of charge provision of this information. 
Some of the social justice trends already flagged up by this paper could be a 
starting point for considering more precisely what a social justice based EU 
consumer policy should look like. The question of values underpinning EU law and 
policy is highly topical given recent EU Commission initiatives to improve general 
consumer law167 and academic concerns about the current direction of EU consumer 
                                                     
166 de Witte, note 166, 2. 
167 The REFIT of Consumer law that required a major evaluation of key consumer law directives and resulting in 
a package of measures to strengthen enforcement of consumer law. See Commission, Results of the Fitness 
Check of consumer and marketing law and of the evaluation of the Consumer Rights Directive < 
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law.168 Further research is needed to examine the extent to which the theoretical 
model discussed here is suitable for transplantation  more generally in EU consumer 
law, i.e. what social justice measures are already in place in general consumer law, 
how effective they are, and what could be implemented by analogy to those used in 
financial contracts. One important dimension of this will involve questioning where 
the balance lies across EU consumer policy generally between the information 
paradigm which as we have seen is of very limited effect in addressing inequalities, 
and more substantive regulation of terms, products and services, which is likely to be 
more effective in this regard and can therefore more legitimately claim to have social 
justice goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=59332> accessed 15 June 2018 and Commission, A 
New Deal for Consumers (COM/2018/0183 final, 2018). 
168 E.g. Geraint Howells, ‘Europe’s (Lack of) Vision of Consumer Protection: A Case of Rhetoric Hiding 
Substance?’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz, Stephen Wetherill The Images of the Consumer in EU Law (Hart, 2016); 
Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘The future of consumer law – plea for a movable system’ (2013) 1 Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law 5; Howells et al, note 46, 7-8. 
